A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define an intuitive class of incentive compatible information disclosure mechanisms which we coin interim optimal mechanisms. We prove that an interim optimal mechanism exists, and that it is an equilibrium […]
Abstract: New regulations promote the role of Central Counter-Parties as insurers of counterparty risk to stabilize derivative markets. Most CCPs are for-profit institutions, competing for profits and market shares. Whether competition is harmful or beneficial to efficiency and financial stability is debatable, leading to different positions in the US and the EU. Assessing the impact […]
Les politiques publiques en matière de vaccination sont d’une importance fondamentale dans l’éradication de virus aux proportions pandémiques. Au vu de l’offre limitée des vaccins et de la nécessité urgente de leur déploiement, il est vital d’établir, avec circonspection, des ordres de priorité de vaccination. Les principales méthodes de hiérarchisation des priorités s’articulent autour de […]
La plupart des plateformes Internet que nous utilisons quotidiennement fournissent des recommandations, basées sur l’immense masse de données qu’elles accumulent. Facebook, Amazon, Spotify, LinkedIn, Trip Adivsor et bien d’autres plateformes en sont des exemples bien connus. La manière exacte dont les recommandations sont établies varie d’une plateforme à l’autre mais elles reposent toutes sur un […]
Abstract. We propose an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network where two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the players are sufficiently patient, both can guarantee the same […]
Abstract : We analyze a three-sided matching market where institutions own objects and individuals belong to institutions. Institutions pool their objects to enlarge the choice set of individuals. For any institution, the number of individuals who receive an object must be equal to the number of objects initially owned. Under this distributional constraint, individually rational […]