Bounded Rationality

Model uncertainty and direct strategy restrictions in games; analogy-based expectations; equilibrium with coarse feedbacks in repeated games, communication games, signaling games and auctions; machine learning and endogenous analogy partitions; learning through categorizations; reason-based choice; unawareness; motivated beliefs and psychological game theory; overoptimism, overconfidence and selection biases in investment decisions;  ambiguity aversion in risk sharing, asset pricing and games; quantum indeterminacy of beliefs and applications to persuasion; belief updating and dynamic consistency with imprecise probabilistic information.

Researchers : Olivier Compte, Franz Dietrich, Philippe Jehiel, Frederic Koessler, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Jean-Marc Tallon, Vassili Vergopoulos

Related contracts and research grants: ORA project “Ambiguity in dynamic environments”, ERC advanced grant “Learning through categories in social and economic interactions”, ANR grant “Information dissemination with bounded rationality and channel complexity”