Game Theory and Information Economics

Existence and refinements of Nash and Subgame perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games, with applications to bargaining; coalition formation as a bargaining process, with applications to the formation of coalitional government in political economy; farsighted rationality and chains of domination;  investment decisions in dynamic and strategic settings, with applications to innovation decisions and to the economics of science; strategic communication, with applications to the credibility of a government revealing information about disasters to a population; characterization of cooperative games with a stable core, approximation of games and core selection problems; bargaining and their application to public goods; partition function form games and plurality voting, approximations of TU games; dynamic games approach to criminal networks; strategic disclosure and mechanism design with evidences; information design and Bayesian persuasion with competing designers; informed principal games and applications to information disclosure and pricing strategies of sellers; robust equilibria and robust implementation; design of platforms to facilitate acquisition, reuse and transfer of users’ private information.

Researchers: Joseph Abdou, Philippe Bich, Francis Bloch, Catherine Bobtcheff, Bernard Caillaud, Olivier Compte, Gabrielle Demange, Pierre Fleckinger, Michel Grabisch, Philippe Jehiel, Frederic Koessler, Matt Leduc, Antonin Mace, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Olivier Tercieux, Xavier Venel

Related contracts and research grants: ERC advanced grant “Learning through categories in social and economic interactions”, ANR grant “Information dissemination with bounded rationality and channel complexity”