Mechanism and Market Design

Dynamic matching models inspired by the assignment of social housing, high school teachers and administrative positions; assignment methods based on the accumulation of seniority points, contrasting different assignment methods and using queuing theory to construct optimal mechanisms; assignment of temporary property rights (such as hotel rooms and rental cars), combining mechanism design with scheduling problems; organization of insurance markets of large risks; applied mechanism design to problems of communication and to problems related to the fight against corruption and favoritism; corruption and accountability in the context of Green Deals; links between corporate fraud and managerial incentives depending on the potential fraudulent behaviors such as account manipulation, environmental violation, fraud to market or collusion; efficiency of set-asides programs in procurement auctions; optimal discrimination in auctions with endogenous entry; design of teacher assignment; design of new matching algorithms for kidney exchange; rating designs and impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to participate in the market; product steering versus price discrimination in online retail.

Researchers: Francis Bloch, Catherine Bobtcheff, Bernard Caillaud, Olivier Compte, Pierre Fleckinger, Philippe Jehiel, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, David Spector, Olivier Tercieux, Nikhil Vellodi