Individual and Collective Decisions

Aggregation of incomplete preferences, leading to a new approach to recommended system widely used by platforms on the internet; design of collective-decision procedures (apportionment methods in federations, storable votes in committees, approval voting in general elections, voting rules for shareholder meetings, participatory democracy); generalized additive independence models; Choquet and multilinear models; aggregation on countably infinite chains; temporal biases, self-control and sustainability; inequality indexes with multidimensional distributions and generalized quantile functions; aggregation of individual judgments, experts’ opinions and subjective probabilities; Characterization of Hurwicz criterium under uncertainty; axiomatizations of cumulative prospect theory.

Researchers: Philippe Bich, Alain Chateauneuf, Gabrielle Demange, Franz Dietrich, Jean-Pierre Drugeon, Michel Grabisch, Antonin Mace, Jean-Marc Tallon, Vassili Vergopoulos, Stephane Zuber

Related research project: CHOp ANR project.